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INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
CUSTOM BREAKING BY DOMESTIC COURTS
SUZANNE KATZENSTEIN†
ABSTRACT
This Essay identifies a fundamental but overlooked tension
between international adjudication and the evolution of customary
international law (CIL). According to the traditional understanding,
the evolution of CIL requires one or more states to deviate from
existing customary rules and engage in new conduct—a concept that I
refer to as “custom breaking.” A deviation’s legal status is determined
over time, as other states respond by deciding whether to follow the
proposed break or adhere to the existing rule. Therefore, the deviation
cannot be classified definitively as either legal or illegal at the time it
occurs. During the period of state response, CIL necessarily contains
some legal ambiguity and inconsistency. Because an important
function of international adjudication involves resolving ambiguities
in the law, a central tension emerges: international courts may be
called upon to adjudicate a break with CIL before other states have
had the opportunity to decide for themselves whether to follow the
break. Given that most international courts will invalidate deviations
from the status quo, international adjudication risks impeding the
traditional process by which CIL evolves. More specifically,
international adjudication of cases that involve custom breaking may
have both a procedural and a substantive effect: procedurally, it may
short-circuit state responses to the break with CIL, and substantively,
it may deter states from following the custom breaker, even when the
other states are not formally bound by the international judicial
decision. To illustrate these constraining effects, this Essay discusses
three departures by domestic courts from the foreign sovereign
immunity rule. It concludes by proposing that in cases involving
custom breaking, international courts should adopt, as Professor Cass
Sunstein has argued for U.S. courts, a minimalist approach that
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produces narrow and shallow decisions. This judicial strategy would
give states, including their domestic courts, the opportunity to
determine for themselves whether a break with international custom is
the beginning of a new legal rule.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................. 672
I. A Central Tension: The Evolution of Customary International
Law and the Role of International Adjudication ..................... 677
A. The Traditional Customary International Law Process ... 677
B. The Functions of International Adjudication .................... 682
C. The Constraining Effect of International Adjudication
on the Evolution of Customary International Law ........... 685
II. Custom Breaking by Domestic Courts: The Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Rule............................................................ 689
A. Congo v. Belgium .................................................................. 689
B. Germany v. Italy .................................................................... 692
C. The Pinochet Case ................................................................. 696
III. International Judicial Minimalism .................................................. 700
A. Judicial Minimalism in the International Context............. 701
B. Elephants in the Room: The Power Critique..................... 703
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 705

INTRODUCTION
In certain cases, international adjudication and the evolution of
customary international law (CIL) are in profound tension. This
tension stems from the role of international courts in resolving
ambiguities in international law and the manner—widely recognized
as paradoxical—by which CIL evolves. CIL is formed by general and
consistent state practice that is followed out of a “sense of legal duty,”
1
which is referred to as opinio juris. In the traditional conception of
2
CIL, which emphasizes state practice over opinio juris, a state
initiates a change in CIL by deviating from the existing widespread

1. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger./Den.; W. Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3,
para. 77 (Feb. 20); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (“Customary international law results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
2. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001).
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practice and engaging in new conduct. In this sense, the evolution of
3
CIL requires its own breaking. At the time it occurs, the legal status
4
of the break with CIL is uncertain. It is unclear whether the custom5
breaking state is violating CIL or changing it. The legality of the
deviation is determined by how other states respond—whether they
decide to accept the proposed break with CIL or to adhere to the
existing rules. At its heart, then, the evolutionary process of CIL
requires not only a break from custom but also a period of
uncertainty during which other states decide whether to follow
course.
I argue that for a specific class of cases—those involving custom
breaking—international adjudication risks impeding the traditional
process by which CIL evolves. A central function of international
courts is to resolve uncertainties and inconsistencies in the law. When
confronted with a case that entails custom breaking, international
courts will generally invalidate deviations and return customary law
to the status quo, and they may do so before other states have had
time to respond to the break. For some courts, the timing of
adjudication is not in their control. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not have discretionary

3. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE
L.J. 202, 212 (2010) (“The only way for nations to change a rule of CIL (as opposed to
overriding it by treaty) is to violate the rule and hope that other nations accept the new
practice.”); Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of Customary
International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 221, 223 (2010) (describing this feature as “one
of the quirks of CIL”). Some legal scholars adopt a modern conception of CIL, however, which
emphasizes opinio juris over state practice. The modern approach recognizes the possibility for
CIL to change quickly, based on treaties and United Nations (UN) General Assembly
resolutions, and therefore does not require its own breaking. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 758.
For further discussion, see infra Part I.A.
4. “Custom breaking” is defined here as a state’s unilateral departure from widely
accepted state practice.
5. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L.
449, 450–51 (2000) (observing the difficulty in determining how and when CIL crystallizes). It is
possible but unlikely that a court may find itself in a situation of non-liquet, in which a state is
neither violating nor changing CIL, but instead creating it. As Judge Fitzmaurice notes, this
possibility is rare: “In practice, courts hardly ever admit a non-liquet. As is well known, they
adapt existing principles to meet new facts or situations.” Rosalyn Higgins, Policy
Considerations and the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 58, 68 (1968)
(quoting Gerald Fitzmaurice, Judicial Innovation—Its Uses and Its Perils—As Exemplified in
Some of the Work of the International Court of Justice During Lord McNair’s Period of Office,
in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 24,
24 (1965)).

KATZENSTEIN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:12 PM

674

[Vol. 62:671

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
6

jurisdiction. It cannot decline a case and wait for an issue to
percolate—even though this is precisely what the evolutionary
process of CIL traditionally requires. What this means is that
international courts will adjudicate and invalidate breaks with custom
before other states have had an opportunity to respond, engaging in
7
what this Essay refers to as “preemptive” or “early” adjudication.
My core claim is that early adjudication of a custom-breaking
case may have two problematic effects. The first effect, and the
primary focus of this Essay, is procedural. The determination of
whether a deviation from CIL is a violation or “contains the seeds of
8
a new rule” can be ascertained only by examining state responses to
the deviation—not simply by examining the deviation itself. Yet
international adjudication, when it occurs before other states have
had the opportunity to respond, may short-circuit the entire stateresponse stage. This short-circuiting is problematic not because it
prevents CIL from changing, but because it may inhibit states from

6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1186 (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations[, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153,] or in treaties and conventions in force.”). But see id. art.
65, 59 Stat. at 1063, 3 Bevans at 1191 (authorizing jurisdictional discretion when issuing advisory
opinions). This discretion extends only to advisory opinions. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
136, para. 44 (July 9) (explaining that the ICJ has discretion to deny a request for an advisory
opinion but has rarely exercised that power).
7. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (Congo
v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14), is an example of preemptive adjudication
because states had little opportunity to respond before the ICJ issued its decision, see infra Part
II.A. An example of a case that was not preemptive was a dispute between Singapore and
Malaysia adjudicated by the ICJ. See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge (Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12 (May 23). There, the ICJ
evaluated whether, during the nineteenth century, Britain had established sovereignty over,
although not formal title to, the island Pedra Branca in the Singapore Straits although it had not
performed symbolic acts affirming its authority over the territory. Id. paras. 118–24. The ICJ
determined that even though symbolic acts were common, they were not required by CIL
because sovereignty could be established in other ways. Id. para. 149. This case was ripe for
adjudication because other states, Malaysia included, had ample opportunity to respond to
British control over the island in ways that would have at least implicitly entailed taking a
position on whether Britain was required to engage in some form of symbolic act to establish its
sovereignty over the territory. See id. para. 274 (“Malaysia and its predecessors did not respond
in any way to [the United Kingdom and Singapore’s] conduct . . . of all of which . . . it [sic] had
notice.”). For a discussion of this case, see Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez, Methods for the
Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s
Jurisprudence: 2000–2009, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 681, 697 (2011).
8. ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98
(1971).
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determining whether they want CIL to change. The second effect is
more substantive: early adjudication by international courts risks
deterring other states from following the custom breaker and may
therefore prevent new and better rules from emerging. International
judicial decisions can trigger these effects even if they formally bind
9
only the two parties to the dispute. In this Essay I focus on a subset
10
of cases: those that involve international adjudication in which the
custom breaker is a domestic court. The effects of preemptive
international adjudication may be particularly strong in this context
because domestic courts seem more likely than executives or
legislatures to defer to international judicial decisions, at least when
these decisions do not conflict with domestic law or do not incite
11
domestic opposition.
To be sure, international judicial review of domestic courts’
treatment of CIL is relatively rare. Yet when such review does occur,
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. Domestic judicial interpretations of CIL are generally considered to be evidence of
state practice. See, e.g., Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.),
Judgment, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25) (“From the standpoint of International
Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will
and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions . . . .”); Philip M.
Moremen, National Court Decisions as State Practice: A Transjudicial Dialogue?, 32 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 259, 278 (2006) (“The contemporary commentators who have addressed
the status of national decisions are almost unanimous in their view that a national court deciding
a case of international law engages in state practice.”); Anthea Roberts, Comparative
International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57, 62 (2011) (“[N]ational court decisions on matters of international law
are evidence of the practice of the forum State.”). When domestic court interpretations are in
conflict with interpretations of executive or legislative branches, the status of the court decision
as CIL is debatable. See INT’L LAW ASS’N, LONDON CONFERENCE (2000), COMM. ON
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE:
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 cmt. e (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/
download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA30217F376 (“It can happen . . . that
the position of the judiciary (or of the legislature) conflicts with that of the executive. . . . In the
ultimate analysis, since it is the executive which has primary responsibility for the conduct of
foreign relations, that organ’s formal position ought usually to be accorded more weight than
conflicting positions of the legislature or the national courts.”); Roberts, supra, at 62 (“Where
inconsistencies emerge, the conflicting practice must be weighed, considering factors such as
which branch of government has authority over the matter.”); Ingrid Wuerth, The Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State Case, International Law in Domestic Courts, and the Executive Branch,
13 MELB. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1–4, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. For an explanation of why, despite some salient exceptions, domestic courts may be
inclined to follow the decisions of international and supranational courts, see infra Part II.B.
Even if domestic courts are generally reluctant to defy an international judicial decision, state
practice may still evolve if executives or legislatures engage in conduct that contradicts an
international judicial decision. See Wuerth, supra note 10, (manuscript at 3).
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it risks undermining the extent to which CIL is shaped by the
decentralized, evolutionary practice of states—a fundamental element
of CIL. International adjudication’s constraining effect is problematic
not only for CIL, but also for international courts themselves, which
are often directed to apply CIL. The Statute of the International
12
Court of Justice, for instance, identifies CIL as a primary source of
13
law. By customary law’s own terms, a state’s response to a deviation
from CIL—not simply the deviation itself—determines whether a
break constitutes a violation or the beginning of a new rule. Yet, the
ICJ’s review of custom-breaking cases may preempt the stateresponse stage. Even if the ICJ’s review overlaps with state responses,
the court usually fails to distinguish between state practice that
precedes the break and that which follows it, and it does not
14
recognize the latter as warranting particular attention. ICJ
adjudication of custom-breaking cases therefore not only risks
impeding the evolutionary process of CIL but also undermining the
court’s own mandate.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces CIL and its
need for ambiguity and inconsistency in order to evolve. It then
discusses the functions of international courts, particularly their role
in clarifying legal rules and resolving ambiguities in the law. Finally,
Part I argues that these virtuous functions become vices in the context
of custom breaking: they may short-circuit the state-response stage in
the evolution of CIL and also deter states from following a potentially
improved rule. To illustrate the tension between international
adjudication and the evolution of CIL, Part II turns to three cases
involving some form of custom breaking by domestic courts in the
context of the foreign sovereign immunity rule: Arrest Warrant of 11
15
April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
16
17
(Germany v. Italy), and the Pinochet case. It argues that the ICJ
preempted the state-response stage in the first two examples of
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6.
13. See id. art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1187 (“The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply: . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law . . . .”).
14. See infra Part II.A–B.
15. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) (Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
16. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening) (Germany v.
Italy), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
17. R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
(Pinochet), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.).

KATZENSTEIN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/21/2012 4:12 PM

CUSTOM BREAKING BY DOMESTIC COURTS

677

judicial-led custom breaking and that the court may have further
entrenched existing customary rules. It then argues that the absence
of international judicial review in the third example has provided
states with the opportunity to respond to the break with CIL. And
although the traditional customary rule in this example appears to
persist, observers can be more confident that this persistence reflects
the decentralized preferences of states rather than a mandate from an
international court. In this example, moreover, the door remains open
to the future evolution of CIL. Finally, Part III proposes that
international courts adopt a policy of judicial minimalism in specific
types of custom-breaking cases, including cases in which the custom
breakers are domestic courts.
I. A CENTRAL TENSION: THE EVOLUTION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
This Part first elaborates on the traditional conception of CIL,
including the paradoxical process by which it evolves, and suggests
that inconsistency and ambiguity are necessary for CIL to change. It
then discusses the broader function of international adjudication, a
function focused not only on settling disputes between parties but
also on resolving ambiguities and eliminating inconsistencies in
international law. This Part concludes by suggesting that when
domestic courts break from the status quo, the clarifying function of
international courts risks impeding the evolutionary dynamic of
CIL—one state breaks, others respond—by both short-circuiting the
state-response stage and inhibiting other states from following the
custom breaker.
A. The Traditional Customary International Law Process
International law can take the form of treaties or custom. As
noted earlier, CIL is composed of two elements: state practice and
18
opinio juris. State practice is the objective element and refers to the
19
general and consistent practices of states. Opinio juris, the subjective
element, indicates that the practice is committed out of a sense of
legal obligation.

18. Roberts, supra note 2, at 757; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987); Roberts, supra note 2, at 757.
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Until the early twentieth century, international law was primarily
20
customary. Rules governing the treatment of foreign property and
conduct at sea, for instance, were rooted in state practice rather than
in treaties. Over the course of the twentieth century, however, states
21
codified most but not all areas of international law. For example,
22
until the adoption of the Rome Statute, which established the
International Criminal Court, prohibitions on crimes against
23
humanity were found primarily in custom rather than in treaties.
Certain areas of law, such as state responsibility, diplomatic
protection, and state immunity, continue to be regulated by
24
customary rules instead of by treaties. Even for areas that are
heavily codified, however, CIL continues to be relevant. It influences
the interpretation of treaty obligations, fills in treaty gaps, and binds
25
states that have not ratified the relevant treaties.
Traditionally, CIL has evolved through the changing practice of
states. Attempts to identify changing custom have therefore entailed
26
examining inductively individual instances of state practice. State
practice is generally thought to consist of physical and verbal acts by

20. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 3, at 208.
21. Id.
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
23. See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of
Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 129–30 (2008) (describing the source of law under which
World War II war criminals were convicted, given the absence of an applicable treaty); see also
Leila Nadya Sadat, Preface and Acknowledgements to FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, at xix, xxii (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011) (“With the adoption of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute in 1998, crimes against humanity were finally
defined and ensconced in an international convention.”). Before the 1998 Rome Statute, the
charters of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo both included
provisions regarding crimes against humanity, as did the statutes establishing the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Sadat, supra, at xix, xxii.
24. Although the UN adopted a treaty regulating state immunity for certain types of
conduct, it has not entered into force. See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, art. 30, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38, at 11 (Dec. 2, 2004) (providing that the convention
would enter into force following deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession with the UN Secretary General); see also Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n,
50th Sess., Apr. 20–June 12, July 27–Aug. 14, 1998, para. 108(a), U.N. Doc. A/53/10; GAOR,
53d Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1998) (noting that states’ obligations are controlled by treaties and CIL
and that “[t]he customary law approach to diplomatic protection should form the basis” of the
UN’s analysis).
25. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (1999); Bradley & Gulati, supra note
3, at 209.
26. Roberts, supra note 2, at 758.
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27

states. A more recent definition of CIL and an approach for
identifying it, referred to by Professor Anthea Roberts as “modern
custom,” gives primary importance to opinio juris, which “relies
primarily on statements rather than actions,” and is usually reflected
28
in treaties and in international resolutions. According to Roberts,
29
this deductive approach allows CIL to develop more quickly.
This Essay adopts the traditional understanding of CIL. It
assumes that for CIL to evolve, there must exist at least some
evidence of changing state conduct. It further assumes that CIL
cannot change simply through the negotiation of treaties and
30
adoption of declarations in multilateral fora. The distinction
between traditional and modern CIL is important for this Essay
because modern CIL does not evolve through the process of
deviation and state response. International adjudication is therefore
not in similar tension with modern CIL. In this Essay, I use CIL and
“traditional CIL” interchangeably; both refer to the conventional
approach for identifying CIL, which emphasizes the conduct of states.
A proclaimed virtue of traditional CIL is that it evolves without
31
formal agreements among states. The decentralized and dynamic
27. Scholars as well as courts have disagreed sharply, however, about whether state
practice is limited to “only action[s] and not words.” Susan Anderson, When the Law Breaker
Becomes the Law Maker, in THE CHALLENGE OF CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONDS
413, 413–19 (Ustinia Dolgopol & Judith Gardam eds., 2006). More specifically, some scholars
argue that treaties, declarations, or other promises about future conduct can constitute state
practice. Id. at 419–20. Compare S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (mentioning only actions and conventions as generally accepted expressions of
principles of international law), with Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 64–65 (June 27) (finding that
statements by representatives of states may be evidence of state practice).
A similar debate centers on whether resolutions and treaties are evidence of state
practice or of opinio juris. Anderson, supra, at 418–20; see also Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta),
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 27 (June 3) (holding that multilateral conventions are
instrumental in “recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing
them”).
28. Roberts, supra note 2, at 758.
29. Id.
30. For a different take, see Ingrid Wuerth, Reassessing Pinochet’s Legacy, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), which argues that immunity
implicates both traditional and modern forms of CIL.
31. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for
Promoting Efficiency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 89 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds.,
2004) (observing that state practice is a “reliable proxy” for efficient behavior); Anthony
D’Amato, Editorial Comment, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
World Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 402 (1985) (“The rules of international law . . . were not
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nature of CIL distinguishes it from and serves as a powerful
complement to the top-down centralized process of international
treaty making and adjudication. Scholars argue, moreover, that the
decentralized and dynamic nature of CIL makes it more efficient than
32
law rooted in treaties. Whereas treaties result from the punctuated
33
moments of bargaining between states and will “lock in” legal rules,
CIL can, in theory, better accommodate changing state preferences
34
because it is always moving toward an optimal equilibrium. This
dynamic nature is partly characterized by what is referred to as the
35
“chronological paradox.” Although traditional CIL consists of
uniform state practice, in order to evolve it also needs the antithesis
of uniform practice—a state willing to depart from the existing rule.
The opinio juris requirement—that states believe they are acting out
of a legal obligation—makes this requirement paradoxical; states
must deviate from legal rules but at the same time view themselves as
acting within the law. Aside from the fiction this requirement
imposes, the paradox means that a break with existing rules may be at
once both illegal and potentially legal. As Professor David Bederman
notes, “every act contrary to an existing custom ‘contains the seeds of
a new legality,’ and . . . ‘each deviation contains the seeds of a new a
imposed on states from on high, but rather grew out of their interactions over centuries of
practice and became established as customary international law. Thus the rules, almost by
definition, are the most efficient possible rules for avoiding international friction and for
accommodating the collective self-interest of all states.” (citation omitted)). But see Eugene
Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 868–69
(2006) (arguing that CIL should not be treated as one undifferentiated whole because, within
different substantive contexts and different groups of states, it may or may not be efficient).
32. See supra note 31.
33. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (noting that treaties are express promises in written form,
whereas CIL is formed through the spontaneous, decentralized practices of states).
34. See David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary
International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 43 (2010) (stating that, in comparison to
top-down institutions like the International Law Commission (ILC) and treaty drafting, “it
certainly makes sense that there should also be an alternative set of processes for CIL
formation” and that “[t]he dynamic of State practice and CIL offers the best hope for such an
alternative to the glacial pace of treaty-making”). Some scholars argue that these efficiency
features do not translate in practice and that other features ensure CIL’s inefficiency. See
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 3, at 244 (pointing to stickiness and lack of homogeneity among
states as reasons for the inefficiency of international law).
35. See generally David Lefkowitz, (Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary
International Law: A Hartian Approach, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 129 (2008) (explaining the
chronological paradox and arguing that it arises from the conflation of the two steps involved in
CIL’s formation). The chronological paradox is a feature of traditional, not modern, CIL. See
supra note 4.
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36

rule.’” Others point out that “[n]ations forge new law by breaking
37
existing law, thereby leading the way for other nations to follow.”
This chronological paradox is one of the reasons why some
38
scholars critique CIL as incoherent or difficult to ascertain. Scholars
also criticize CIL for being ambiguous and more a “matter of taste”
39
than of clear legal rules. There is rarely consensus on whether a
given state practice is sufficiently uniform and widespread to
constitute a customary rule and whether the opinio juris element has
been adequately met. Thus, the amorphous nature of international
40
custom is problematic from a rule-of-law perspective.
Yet, and this point is frequently overlooked, CIL cannot evolve
without this ambiguity and inconsistency in state practice. Some legal
uncertainty is inevitable given the need for some states to depart from
the status quo and given the decentralized and gradual manner by
which other states respond. Indeed, ambiguity and inconsistency are
strengths of CIL. For instance, they likely embolden states under CIL
to engage in more legal experimentation than states would otherwise
41
do if they were bound by an international treaty. There are two
reasons for this increased willingness to experiment. First, some states
break with CIL because they anticipate that others will follow, or at
42
least not oppose the deviation. Second, even if states ultimately
decide that a deviation is illegal, the ambiguity of the customary rule
until such a determination emerges may mute the consequences
associated with a break. States may be more willing to follow the

36. Bederman, supra note 34, at 37 (quoting G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 & n.379 (1983)).
37. Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1985).
38. See Kelly, supra note 5, at 499 (noting that certain aspects of CIL make it “incoherent”
and “controversial”). For arguments that CIL has always been problematic and of questionable
legitimacy, see W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 133, 135 (1987); and Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem
of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11 (1988).
39. Kelly, supra note 5, at 451.
40. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 3, at 212.
41. In certain cases ambiguity is irrelevant, of course, and states will violate international
law regardless of the form it takes.
42. Canada’s decision in 1970 to unilaterally extend its jurisdiction over waters within one
hundred miles of Canada’s Arctic coast is a possible example. Professor Michael Byers notes,
for instance, that Canada framed its claim “in such a way as to extend fairly easily into a right
which all coastal States could claim for themselves, and which most coastal States were probably
interested in claiming.” BYERS, supra note 25, at 95. Within a decade, Canada’s unilateral
assertion was viewed as having triggered a shift in CIL. Id. at 94.
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custom breaker if it is not clear that doing so will, in the end,
constitute a violation.
B. The Functions of International Adjudication
International courts have numerous functions. Most
43
traditionally, they settle disputes between states. The ICJ Statute,
for instance, declares that the ICJ’s “function is to decide . . . such
44
disputes as are submitted to it.” Although dispute settlement is
important, it would be myopic to consider dispute settlement to be
the only judicial function. Professor Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo
Venzke identify three other important functions that international
courts serve: stabilizing normative expectations, making law, and
45
controlling and legitimating public authority. This Essay focuses on
the first of these three contributions because it is the “stabilizing” role
of international adjudication that is in direct tension with the
uncertainty that CIL requires for its evolution.
Courts stabilize normative and legal expectations when they
clarify the status of legal rules. Adopting a rationalist game-theoretic
approach, some legal scholars discuss this clarifying role in terms of a
46
court’s “coordinating function.” Professors Tom Ginsburg and
Richard McAdams, for instance, propose an “expressive theory” of
international adjudication in which international courts create new
focal points by identifying which of two conflicting legal
47
interpretations of a rule is correct. This third-party intervention
allows the two parties to the dispute to then coordinate around and
comply with the decisive interpretation. A key premise here is that,
for certain disputes, both parties prefer coordination with respect to
either of the two interpretations over no coordination but disagree
over which interpretation is best. Once a court clarifies the applicable
legal rule, compliance becomes self-enforcing.
43. Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Functions of International Courts: An
Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority 6–7 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int’l Law,
Working Paper No. 2012-10, 2012). For other discussions of the functions of international
courts, see, for example, Dinah Shelton, Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts,
9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 537, 538–40 (2009); and Karen J. Alter, The New International Courts: A Bird’s
Eye View 38–39 (Buffet Ctr. for Int’l & Comparative Studies, Working Paper No. 09-001, 2009).
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 6, art 38(1), 59 Stat. at 1060, 3
Bevans at 1187.
45. von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 43, at 6–12.
46. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2004).
47. Id. at 1270–71.
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Although the expressive theory is intended to apply only to
states that are parties to the dispute, international judicial decisions
that clarify existing rules also influence states that are not formally
48
49
bound by the decision —for both rationalist and legitimacy reasons.
First, international judicial decisions shape contemporary
50
understandings of international legal rules and signal information
51
about the likelihood and content of future judicial decisions. Even
U.S. courts, which have been among the most explicitly defiant of ICJ
52
rulings, turn occasionally to ICJ decisions for guidance in
53
interpreting international law.

48. For a review of the literature on the impact of international court decisions on those
not party to the dispute, see generally Laurence R. Helfer, The Effectiveness of International
Adjudicators, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (Karen J.
Alter, Cesare Romano & Yuval Shany eds., forthcoming 2013) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
49. See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe 7–9 (July 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1850526 (arguing that
international judicial decisions can influence states—and constituencies within them—through
three pathways: “the threat of future litigation, the persuasive authority of judicial reasoning,
and the agenda-setting effect” and finding that judgments supporting LGBT policy issues by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) increase the probability of national policy reform
even for countries not subject to membership conditionality).
50. See Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International
Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127, 132 (2010) (explaining how “the jurisprudential
acquis of the ICJ on such essential questions as state responsibility, countermeasures and treaty
interpretation has been repeatedly invoked” in various contexts); Jordan J. Paust, Domestic
Influence of the International Court of Justice, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 787, 787–88 (1998)
(“[D]ecisions and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice have generally been
widely received as authoritative explications of international law. . . . [They] have acquired a
functional significance far beyond what printed constitutive articles might have allowed.”).
51. As Professors Andrew Guzman and Timothy Meyer state, “[t]here is no doubt that
international tribunals’ decisions signal the direction of future rulings and, de facto, define the
contours of the legal obligations states face.” Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer,
International Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 515, 516
(2009); see also Alvarez-Jiménez, supra note 7, at 705 (“The declaration of a rule as customary
or the denial of such status may have important consequences on States’ practice in the sense
that the declaration may promote the practice of the given rule . . . , while the denial may give
States a powerful reason not to follow the specific practice in question, thereby affecting its
possible emergence as custom in the future.”).
52. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“[W]hile treaties may
comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing
and is ratified on these terms.” (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
375 (1998) (“[W]hile we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an
international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such, it has
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Second, international judicial decisions can legitimize or
delegitimize a particular legal rule or legal norm, shaping—both
directly and indirectly—the views of state officials, judges, and other
54
actors about whether to follow it. Many international legal scholars
have long recognized that even in the absence of traditional
sanctioning mechanisms, international law, when it is viewed as
55
legitimate, exerts a “compliance pull.” Although most scholarship in
56
this vein focuses on state incentives, the same logic applies to
substate actors such as domestic courts. Under this view, domestic
courts comply with international law, including international judicial
57
decisions, because they consider the legal rules to be legitimate.
Domestic courts may also comply with international law because they
58
view themselves as participants in a global practice of judging.
These functions of international judicial decisions—providing
information about current legal interpretations, signaling the likely

been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary,
the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.”).
53. In his study of U.S. judicial treatment of ICJ decisions between 1946 and 1998,
Professor Jordan Paust counts forty-two cases in which federal courts applied ICJ decisions or
advisory opinions to determine the content of international law. Paust, supra note 50, at 791–92.
In Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1317, at *1–2 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012),
for example, the U.S. district court cited the ICJ’s decision in Avena & Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), despite the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), which held that Avena did not preempt the
procedural rules of states, id. at 505–06. For a discussion of other cases in the United States that
have recognized or declined to recognize ICJ decisions, see David M. Reilly & Sarita Ordonez,
Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 435, 459–64 (1997).
54. See Howse & Teitel, supra note 50, at 130–31 (discussing the complexity of norms and
also noting the more rationalist point that “instead of changing behavior directly, international
legal norms . . . may make it more possible or less costly for a state to adhere to an existing or
recently adopted policy course”); Niels Petersen, Lawmaking by the International Court of
Justice—Factors of Success, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1295, 1310 (2011) (noting the ICJ’s impact,
through its judgment in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment,
1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), on the “subsequent legal discourse and the communicative practice of
states” with respect to the erga omnes norm).
55. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J INT’L L. 705, 712
(1988). See generally id. (explaining that rules with certain characteristics are more likely to be
obeyed, and that the compliance rate is one indicator of a rule’s legitimacy).
56. See, e.g., id. at 705–06 (examining the “surprising” phenomenon of why “nations ever
obey [international law’s] strictures or carry out its mandates”).
57. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 (1990).
58. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104 (2000)
(stating that domestic judges recognize and interact with supranational courts because of “a
deep sense of participation in a common global enterprise of judging, an awareness that
provides a foundation for a global community of law”).
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nature of future decisions, and legitimizing current legal norms—may
be particularly powerful in cases in which domestic courts are the
custom breakers. Domestic courts face the task of identifying the
content of and enforcing legal rules, and courts’ identities are shaped
by their obligation to apply legal rules, not violate them. At least in
the absence of a conflict with domestic law or pressure from the other
branches of government, domestic courts may be more inclined than
their executive or legislative counterparts to follow nonbinding
international judicial decisions.
C. The Constraining Effect of International Adjudication on the
Evolution of Customary International Law
In the context of custom breaking by domestic courts, the role of
international courts in clarifying legal rules risks impeding the
traditional evolutionary process of CIL in which one state acts and
others respond. Whether international adjudication ultimately has
this constraining effect will depend on a number of factors, such as
whether the international court views itself as a “law creator[] . . . [or]
59
enforcer[],” and whether the adjudication occurs soon after the
deviation. If a court views itself as generally upholding rather than
60
changing the status quo, as characterizes the ICJ, it is likely to
invalidate any departure from CIL. If a legal claim challenging
custom breaking is filed shortly after such a break occurs, a court’s
invalidation will preempt state response. Alternatively, if the claim is
filed after other states have begun to respond to the break, a court
can evaluate the state-response stage rather than preempt or deter it.
But this point raises the question of how much of an opportunity
states should have before a break with CIL becomes amenable to
international judicial review. There is no hard-and-fast rule and, in
some cases, a clear line may be difficult to draw. Ultimately, however,
the issue of whether a case is ripe for judicial review is itself worthy of
an international court’s attention before it proceeds to evaluate a case
on its merits.

59. Roberts, supra note 10, at 64. For an elaboration of this distinction as applied to
domestic courts, see id. at 64–73.
60. The ICJ has consistently been a follower of existing interpretations, not a trendsetter,
at least since Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). Even in cases in which the ICJ has used a modern
deductive approach to identifying CIL, its determinations simply confirmed already widely
accepted views about the content of CIL. Alvarez-Jiménez, supra note 7, at 690, 693.
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At least one other scholar has recognized the potential for
international adjudication to interfere with the evolution of CIL.
Professor Roger O’Keefe argues that international courts can trigger
61
a “customary international legal feedback loop.” In this loop an
international court, which sees itself as following state practice,
upholds traditional CIL on the basis that domestic judicial decisions
62
continue to adhere to it. Domestic courts in turn view the
international court’s ruling as evidence that traditional CIL persists,
63
and then continue to follow such customs.
O’Keefe’s model accurately captures the dynamic that occurs
when international and domestic courts simply follow one another’s
lead, but it leaves unclear why this dynamic is problematic. I argue
that an early international adjudication of a break with custom that
occurs before states have had the opportunity to respond is
problematic in two respects: substantively, it may discourage others
from following the custom breaker and prevent better CIL from
emerging; and procedurally, regardless of whether states decide to
follow the custom breaker, it cuts short the opportunity for states to
debate and respond to deviations from the status quo. This Essay
focuses primarily on the procedural effect.
First, on a substantive level, international adjudication of
custom-breaking cases may prevent better CIL from emerging. Legal
scholars who study U.S. jurisprudence, and indeed U.S. Supreme
Court Justices themselves, have recognized the value of allowing
issues to percolate before subjecting them to Supreme Court review.
Justice Stevens, for instance, has noted:
The process of percolation allows a period of exploratory
consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the
Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule. The
Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the
benefit of the experience of those lower courts. Irrespective of
docket capacity, the Court should not be compelled to intervene to

61. Roger O’Keefe, State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and
Minds, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 999, 1017 (2011).
62. See id. at 1019 (explaining that international case law is influenced by both
international and domestic law).
63. Id.
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eradicate disuniformity when further percolation or experimentation
64
is desirable.

This insight applies also to custom breaking. International
adjudication in the context of custom breaking not only has the effect
of insisting on uniformity but, especially for international courts with
nondiscretionary jurisdiction, leaves little room for the type of
65
“exploratory consideration” that can help improve the quality of
66
legal rules and judicial decisions.
More fundamentally, and regardless of whether international
adjudication prevents CIL from improving, early adjudication blocks
the process by which traditional CIL evolves. For this reason
international judicial review in this context may lack legitimacy, at
least from the perspective of CIL. Given the broader impact of ICJ
decisions, for example, an early ICJ invalidation of a break with
custom makes it more costly for other states to follow the custom
breaker and less necessary for those that would oppose the break to
do so explicitly. As a result, states maintain or revert to the status
quo, and debate around the question is forestalled. The fundamental
64. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 438
(2004) (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see
also id. at 403 n.71 (“We have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems
are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate
courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”
(quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
65. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984).
66. The proliferation of international courts offers no panacea, although it may marginally
mitigate the constraining effect of international adjudication in the context of custom breaking.
It is true that the greater the diversity and number of international courts, the less impact a
single court can exert on the future evolution of a customary rule. Yet, international courts
generally try to ensure consistency with one another. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of
International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction—Problems and Possible
Solutions, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 67, 76–77 (2001) (“In particular the
jurisprudence of the ICJ is often referred to by other judicial bodies as stating the generally
applicable law . . . .”). This is partly for the reason mentioned earlier: international courts
usually follow, rather than lead, existing interpretations of CIL. See supra note 60. And this is
true not only between international and domestic courts but also among international courts. As
former ICJ President Bruno Simma stated,
I would go as far as claiming that if there are international institutions that are
constantly and painstakingly aware of the necessity to preserve the coherence of
international law, it is the international courts and tribunals. Such caution might
sometimes come at the price of dodging issues that would very much have deserved to
be tackled . . . .
Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845, 846 (2004).
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problem in these cases is that international adjudication inhibits the
evolutionary process of CIL from beginning. Yet this process of
decentralized reactions by states is at the heart of what distinguishes
CIL from other sources of international law.
Although his focus is on “law in flux” and not custom breaking,
Professor Vaughan Lowe advances a similar argument: “What
premature litigation . . . does, is short-circuit [public debate over a
potential new legal standard]. It delivers a verdict which purports to
settle the question definitively, but does so without the benefit of
67
informed analysis and comment on the matter.” By centralizing an
important decision in the hands of a few judges rather than keeping it
decentralized across all states, international adjudication in custombreaking cases stifles a debate that may lead to a better rule and
supplants a process that is open, at least theoretically, to the
participation of all states. International law evolves through both topdown and bottom-up processes. Immediate adjudication of custombreaking cases, however, risks replacing rather than complementing
68
CIL.

67. Vaughan Lowe, The Function of Litigation in International Society, 61 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 209, 216 (2012); cf. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing the International Law of Sovereign
Immunity Through National Decisions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1185, 1197 (2011) (“In order
for the customary international law of sovereign immunity to continue to evolve in response to
actions and reactions of diverse decision makers in a variety of countries (judicial, legislative,
and executive), an active dialogue among institutions should be encouraged. Inter-judicial
dialogue—the process by which courts take note of previous rulings elsewhere and determine
whether or not to follow them—can illuminate the issues and articulate reasons either for
maintaining traditional conceptions of state immunity or for adjusting preconceptions in light of
evolving views on the optimal role for national courts in providing remedies for wrongs
committed by foreign states.”).
68. One important objection to this Essay’s critique of international adjudication of custom
breaking focuses on the logical inference that any case that the ICJ or other international courts
adjudicate that involves CIL arguably involves custom breaking. Taken literally, the statement
that “[e]ach deviation contains the seeds of a new rule,” D’AMATO, supra note 8, at 98, implies
that even the most egregious conduct—for example uncontested crimes of aggression—should,
by this Essay’s logic, be shielded from international adjudication until states respond.
Admittedly the critique advanced in this Essay requires acknowledging outright that not all
custom-breaking cases are the same. Only some cases of custom breaking can reasonably be
expected to have the potential to become a new legal rule—perhaps those in which there is
political or public debate about the direction that CIL should take. The argument advanced in
this Essay addresses these types of cases.
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II. CUSTOM BREAKING BY DOMESTIC COURTS:
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RULE
To illustrate the potential of international adjudication to inhibit
the evolution of CIL, this Part draws on two ICJ rulings that
invalidated domestic judicial breaks from the customary rules of
head-of-state immunity and state immunity. The discussion suggests
that the ICJ’s adjudication in these cases preempted state response
that follow or should follow a break with CIL. Even in cases in which
69
there is some state practice following a deviation, the ICJ has
exhibited little awareness that this practice, as part of the stateresponse stage, is important for determining the legality of the
original break from CIL. Additionally, this Part discusses a third
example of custom breaking, the Pinochet case, which involved the
immunity of a former head of state and proceeded without review by
an international court. I argue that the absence of preemptive
adjudication in this case has kept the door more open to future legal
change than in the other two cases. More importantly, the absence of
preemptive adjudication has ensured that the decentralized dynamic
of CIL has shaped, and continues to shape, the current legal rule. The
central claim in this Part is that, regardless of whether states
ultimately choose to follow a break with CIL, states are able to make
the decisions for themselves if international courts have not first
adjudicated the issue. By contrast, when international courts engage
in early review of a custom-breaking case, they risk halting the
traditional process by which CIL evolves.
A. Congo v. Belgium
70

In Congo v. Belgium, international adjudication led to the
invalidation of a court-led break with the custom of granting
71
immunity to high-level incumbent officials. Other states had little
opportunity to determine on their own whether they should adhere to
the existing rule or follow the custom breaker. On April 11, 2000, a
Brussels court issued an international arrest warrant for the then-

69. This Part focuses on domestic judicial decisions, but the critique applies to other forms
of state practice as well, including executive statements and national legislation. For a discussion
of the problem of conflicting state practice by different domestic actors, see generally Wuerth,
supra note 10.
70. Congo v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
71. Cf. id. para. 58 (finding no exception to the rule that current ministers for foreign
affairs are immune from criminal jurisdiction).
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incumbent minister of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of
72
Congo (DRC). Based on universal jurisdiction, the arrest warrant
alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes in connection with
73
the 1998 Kinshasa massacre. This case marked a salient break from
CIL because it was the first time a court had issued an international
74
arrest warrant against an incumbent high-level official. In its petition
to the ICJ, the DRC claimed that Belgium, in permitting its court to
issue the arrest warrant, violated the immunity of DRC officials and
that the Belgian court’s assertion of universal jurisdiction violated the
75
DRC’s sovereignty.
In February 2002, the ICJ ruled in a 13-to-3 decision that
Belgium had violated the custom of granting incumbent high-level
76
officials immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts. In
77
a decision that has been deemed “remarkable for its brevity,” the
ICJ noted that, after a careful review of state practice, it found no
exception to the customary rule of sovereign immunity for human
78
79
rights violations. The ICJ decision received mixed reactions. Some
criticized the decision for stating in dicta that immunity applies even
80
to former heads of state and high-level officials. Others disparaged
the court for reaching its decision “without reference to any
81
supporting state practice.”

72. Id. para. 1.
73. Id. para. 67.
74. For example, there was no arrest warrant issued for Muammar Gaddafi when he was
tried in France in 2000 for a 1989 plane explosion. Gaddafi, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 13, 2001, D. Jur., No. 2631, translated in 125 I.L.R. 490
(2004).
75. Application Instituting Proceedings, Congo v. Belgium, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2000),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/7081.pdf.
76. Congo v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 78.
77. Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?
Some Comments on the Congo v. Belguim Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 854 (2002).
78. Congo v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 58.
79. Compare Cassese, supra note 77, at 855 (“By and large this conclusion is
convincing . . . . The Court must be commended for elucidating and spelling out an obscure issue
of existing law.”), with Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 877, 878 (2002) (“[T]he ICJ erred in its decision that
there exists immunity for former Ministers of Foreign Affairs which attaches to the official
nature of an act, if a core crime has been committed . . . .”).
80. E.g., Adam Day, Note, Crimes Against Humanity as a Nexus of Individual and State
Responsibility: Why the ICJ Got Belgium v. Congo Wrong, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 489, 490–91
(2004).
81. Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes,
and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 820 (2011).
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Although the ICJ’s review of the state-practice prong of CIL was
82
brief, what makes the judgment problematic from a procedural
perspective was the lack of inquiry into how states responded or were
responding to Belgium’s break with CIL. The ICJ summarized the
conflicting Belgian and DRC interpretations of the British House of
Lords’ 1999 decision rejecting immunity in the Pinochet case and the
French Court of Cassation’s 2001 decision upholding the immunity of
83
then-head of state Muammar Qaddafi. But the ICJ did not provide
84
its own evaluation of the specific cases. Even more relevantly, it
neither distinguished the Qaddafi case as part of the state-response
stage, nor evaluated whether the French Court of Cassation was
85
explicitly rejecting, or was even aware of, the Belgian deviation. The
ICJ, furthermore, made no reference to what seems to have been the
only other immunity case involving an incumbent head of state during
the period between Belgium’s issuing the arrest warrant in April 2000
and the ICJ’s handing down its decision in February 2002. In
86
87
Tachiona v. Mugabe, a federal district court in New York held, with
no reference to Belgium’s arrest warrant, that Zimbabwe’s president
and foreign minister were protected by head-of-state and diplomatic
88
immunity from claims arising under the Alien Tort Statute and the
89
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. The point is not that states
had begun to react positively to Belgium’s deviation; both Qaddafi
and Tachiona suggest the opposite. Rather, the argument is that the
ICJ preempted rather than evaluated state responses to Belgium’s
break with CIL. If the ICJ had engaged in an analysis of the two
cases, or indeed of any other type of state response that would have
qualified as state practice, then the ICJ would have been more
aligned with the process by which CIL traditionally evolves: based on
state reactions to the deviation, not the deviation itself. Instead, the
ICJ did not inquire into state responses at all.
82. The majority opinion cited two cases and five treaties. Congo v. Belgium, Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 58.
83. Id. paras. 56–57 (discussing Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.), and Gaddafi, Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 13, 2001, D. Jur., No. 2631,
translated in 125 I.L.R. 490 (2004)).
84. See id. paras. 56–58.
85. See id.
86. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part sub. nom.
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 315–16.
88. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
89. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
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The more fundamental point—which the ICJ, lacking
discretionary jurisdiction, cannot control—is that states did not have
much opportunity to respond to Belgium’s issuing the arrest warrant.
As noted earlier, it would be difficult to formulate a bright-line rule
determining how much opportunity states should have before a break
with CIL is subjected to international judicial review. But the fact that
only two states appeared to have faced a similar case by the time the
court issued its decision in Congo v. Belgium suggests that the ICJ
adjudication occurred problematically early.
The ICJ decision is also troubling from a more substantive
perspective: even though other courts are not formally bound by the
ICJ judgment, the decision may well deter them from following
Belgium’s now-invalidated deviation from the custom regulating
head-of-state immunity. From a rationalist perspective, domestic
courts may be reluctant to reject state claims to immunity for
incumbent high-level officials because the courts will calculate that an
international court would reverse its decision as well. Domestic courts
may also be reluctant for more normative reasons; the ICJ ruling
against Belgium reaffirms the norm of sovereign equality, even in an
era of individual accountability for human-rights crimes. If either or
both of these rationales are correct, then the ICJ ruling makes
domestic judicial restrictions of immunity less likely now than before
Belgium departed from the status quo. Put differently, the ICJ
decision may have not only invalidated a break from CIL, but further
entrenched the existing rule.
B. Germany v. Italy
90

In the second custom-breaking example, Germany v. Italy, the
ICJ again invalidated a court-led break with CIL—this time
regulating the immunity rule for states. Compared to the Congo v.
Belgium case, domestic courts had more time to respond to the break
before the ICJ handed down its ruling—almost eight years instead of
91
two. But by the time the ICJ issued its decision, there were still only

90. Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 101 (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/143/16883.pdf.
91. In Congo v. Belgium, the Belgian judge issued the arrest warrant in April 2000. Congo
v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 1 (Feb. 14). The ICJ issued its judgment
approximately two years later, in February 2002. See id. at 3. In comparison, the Italian Supreme
court issued its decision rejecting Germany’s claim to immunity in Ferrini v. Federal Republic of
Germany, Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2007, I, 936 (It.), translated in 128
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a handful of judicial rulings outside of Italy that were part of the
state-response stage. While relying extensively on domestic judicial
92
decisions to determine state practice, the ICJ conducted only a
limited inquiry into the judicial rulings that followed the initial
deviation and showed little awareness that, as part of the stateresponse stage, these rulings warranted particular attention. Although
this Section focuses on the ICJ’s analysis of domestic judicial
decisions, the same critique applies to its treatment of other forms of
93
state practice, such as national legislation. The ICJ did not
distinguish legislation and other forms of state practice that preceded
94
Italy’s break with CIL—the 2004 Ferrini decision—from that which
95
followed the break. Both the dearth of state response to the initial
deviation and the ICJ’s lack of inquiry into the limited state practice
that did follow it are problematic from a procedural perspective.
In the 2004 Ferrini decision, the Italian Supreme Court rejected
Germany’s claim for immunity from allegations that Germany
deported and subjected an Italian national to forced labor during
96
World War II. The court justified its decision on ground that the
rules regulating jus cogens norms prevail over rules regulating state
97
immunity. With the exception of a Greek high-court ruling against
Germany, which was superseded before the Italian Supreme Court
98
ruling, the Italian 2004 rejection was a sharp break from the
I.L.R. 659 (2006), in March 2004. The ICJ handed down its decision invalidating the Italian
ruling in February 2012. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment.
92. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment, paras. 72–76.
93. In Germany v. Italy, the ICJ identified state practices of “particular significance” to
include domestic judicial decisions involving immunity claims, national legislation regulating
immunity, government claims to immunity, and statements made by states in the context of the
ILC and UN’s work on the immunity question. Id. para. 55.
94. Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it.
2007, I, 936 (It.), translated in 128 I.L.R. 659 (2006).
95. For example, in its analysis of national legislation, the ICJ did not distinguish legislation
adopted before the Italian break with CIL from national legislation enacted after the break. See
id. para. 70. In its discussion of the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, moreover, the ICJ noted that the delegates clearly
chose to exclude military activities from the scope of the treaty, but did not discuss whether the
delegates made this decision in reaction to or with any awareness of the Ferrini case. See
Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 69.
96. Ferrini, Foro it. 2007, I, at 945, 128 I.L.R. at 661.
97. Id. at 942, 128 I.L.R. at 668–69. The Italian Supreme Court also justified its decision
based on the argument that Germany’s violations occurred on Italian territory. See id. at 945,
128 I.L.R. at 670–72.
98. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 76 (noting that Margellos v. Federal Republic of
Germany, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece),
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traditional state immunity rule and led to a stream of cases against
99
Germany. Germany filed an application to the ICJ against Italy in
100
2008, alleging that Italy had violated its immunity under CIL.
The ICJ issued a decision in February 2012 upholding Germany’s
101
jurisdictional immunity from Italian courts.
In reaching this
decision, the ICJ considered two core arguments advanced by Italy,
one that the ICJ labeled as the “territorial tort principle” and the
second that involved a combination of claims regarding Germany’s
violations of fundamental rules and the lack of reparations for these
102
violations. This Essay focuses on the ICJ’s treatment of the latter
argument, and particularly on its treatment of Italy’s claim that
violations of jus cogens norms, when combined with the lack of
reparations, eliminate a state’s right to claim immunity from foreign
103
courts. The ICJ considered both a disaggregated version of Italy’s
104
argument (violation of jus cogens norms and right to reparations),
105
as well as the additive version that Italy actually advanced in its
106
The ICJ concluded that the rules regulating
Counter-Memorial.

translated in 129 I.L.R. 526 (2007), “repudiated the reasoning of [an earlier Greek high-court
ruling] and held that Germany was entitled to immunity”).
99. See Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germany v. Italy, paras. 23–45
(June 12, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16644.pdf (describing the cases).
100. Application Instituting Proceedings, Germany v. Italy, at 1 (Dec. 23, 2008),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/14923.pdf.
101. Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 139(1).
102. Id. paras. 61–108.
103. See Counter-Memorial of Italy, Germany v. Italy, paras. 4.5, 4.66–4.77 (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16648.pdf (“[A] State responsible for violations of
fundamental rules is not entitled to immunity in cases in which, if granted, immunity would be
tantamount to exonerating the State from bearing the legal consequences of its violation of
principles of paramount importance.”). This argument is distinct from the argument adopted by
Italian Supreme Court in Ferrini, which focused only on jus cogens norms. See Ferrini v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2007, I, 936 (It.), translated
in 128 I.L.R. 659 (2006).
Although not discussed in this Essay, Germany also alleged two other claims: (1) that
Italy had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by declaring a Greek judgment against
Germany to be enforceable in Italy (the Greek judgment was superseded but not overturned by
the subsequent Greek decision in the Margellos case, see Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 76;
Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 99, para. 65); and that (2) Italy
violated Germany’s immunity from enforcement by attaching German-owned property in Italy
to ensure the enforcement of the Greek decision against Germany, see Memorial of the Federal
Republic of Germany, supra note 99, paras. 33–41, 103–107. The ICJ also upheld these two
claims. Germany v. Italy, Judgment, paras. 139.2–139.3.
104. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment, paras. 92–103.
105. See id. paras. 105–06.
106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.

KATZENSTEIN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/21/2012 4:12 PM

CUSTOM BREAKING BY DOMESTIC COURTS

695

violations of jus cogens norms and the right to reparations and those
107
regulating immunity “address different matters.” It continued,
“[t]he rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are
confined to determining whether or not the courts of one State may
108
exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State.”
Relative to the Congo v. Belgium case, states had more time, and
perhaps more opportunity, to react to Italy’s deviation. The ICJ,
however, devoted minimal attention to other state responses to the
Italian Supreme Court’s argument that jus cogens norms prevail over
claims to immunity. The ICJ cited to six decisions by domestic courts
outside of Italy that have also addressed the jus cogens norms
109
argument, each of which upheld the immunity claim. The ICJ
showed little recognition that, for evaluating the legality of the Italian
break with CIL, the four decisions that followed the Ferrini decision
should carry more weight than the two that preceded it. The ICJ also
did not evaluate whether those four decisions specifically repudiated
110
Italy’s break with CIL in Ferrini. That is, the ICJ showed little
awareness that both the number and the content of the post-Ferrini
decisions are important for evaluating Italy’s break with the state
immunity rule.

107. Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 93.
108. Id.
109. Id. para. 96. Canada’s decision is Bouzari v. Iran (Islamic Republic) (2004), 243 D.L.R.
4th 406 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Greece’s decision is Margellos. New Zealand’s decision is Fang v.
Jiang [2007] 141 NZAR 420 (HC), reprinted in 141 I.L.R 702 (2011). Poland’s decision is
Natoniewski v. Federal Republic of Germany, [Supreme Court] Oct. 29, 2010, see Polish Practice
in International Law, 30 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 299 (2010). Slovenia’s decision is Ustavno Sodisce
[Constitutional Court of Slovenia] Mar. 8, 2001, Case No. Up-13/99, available at
http://odlocitve.us-rs.si/usrs/us-odl.nsf/bcaf0777a0b458cac12579c30036ecff/c0440295eef5e 741c1
2571720028f197/$FILE/Up-13-99_an.pdf. The United Kingdom’s decision is Jones v. Saudi
Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (H.C.). The Greek and Slovenian decisions were
handed down before Ferrini, in September 2002 and March 2001, respectively.
The Bouzari decision was handed down in June 2004, only a few months after Ferrini.
But the proximity in time does not explain the ICJ’s silence in analyzing this case given that the
ICJ also did not discuss the December 2006 Fang decision. The court did briefly discuss the June
2006 Jones decision, but only to distinguish state immunity from head-of-state immunity, not to
evaluate it as evidence of state reactions to the Ferrini case. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment,
para. 87.
110. The ICJ similarly failed to evaluate the response of non-Italian courts to the Ferrini
argument about the relevance of territoriality of the crimes with one exception, the Polish
Natoniewski decision. See Germany v. Italy, Judgment, para. 74. The ICJ also did not note which
domestic judicial decisions concerning the gravity-of-violations argument preceded the Ferrini
ruling and which followed it. Id. paras. 83–85.
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Particularly because domestic courts are the central actors
evaluating claims to immunity, the ICJ’s invalidation of the Italian
deviation may have the substantive effect of entrenching the existing
111
sovereign immunity rule. As with the Congo v. Belgium case, for
both rationalist and normative reasons, other domestic courts may be
influenced by the ICJ’s decision even though they are not formally
bound by it. Indeed, in light of the ICJ’s affirmation of the traditional
sovereign immunity rule, domestic courts may feel even more
compelled than before to adhere to the state immunity rule.
A potential objection to the argument that the ICJ may impede
the evolution of CIL in this area is that it is the states themselves, not
international courts, which pose the true barriers to changing the
state immunity rule. Indeed, one might even suggest that executives
turned to the ICJ strategically, calculating that the court would
uphold Germany’s immunity and therefore not only clarify but also
112
strengthen the existing sovereign immunity rule. This objection,
however, misses the point. This Essay’s critique of international
adjudication in custom-breaking cases is based primarily on process,
rather than outcome. Regardless of whether the ICJ’s ruling is
consistent with what states would have ultimately decided for
themselves, it is procedurally problematic for the ICJ to preempt the
traditional process by which CIL evolves.
C. The Pinochet Case
113

The Pinochet case reveals two advantages of allowing the CIL
process to unfold organically rather than allowing it to be preempted
111. But see Paul Christoph Bornkamm, State Immunity Against Claims Arising from War
Crimes: The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State, 13 GERMAN L.J. 773, 782 (2012) (“The Court’s findings . . . are likely to discourage
national courts from assuming an exception to immunity applicable to claims arising from
serious violations . . . . However, the approach taken by the Court should not be understood as
an obstacle to possible new developments of the law in that field. In fact, hope remains that the
relationship between state immunity and the right of access to justice will continue to be a
dynamic one. This hope rests in the fact that the main actors here are courts, not governments.
It is up to courts to determine the scope of jurisdictional immunity in a particular case—and
they are more likely to be driven by considerations of justice than by political concerns.”).
112. For instance, when Germany submitted its petition to the ICJ against Italy, the Italian
government issued a joint declaration with Germany expressing support for the petition and the
opportunity for the ICJ to clarify the law. See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening): Greece Requests Permission To
Intervene in the Proceedings 3 (Jan. 17, 2011), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/143/16294.pdf.
113. Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.).

KATZENSTEIN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/21/2012 4:12 PM

CUSTOM BREAKING BY DOMESTIC COURTS

697

114

by an international court. First, observers can be confident that the
apparent, albeit contested, persistence of the immunity rule despite
the Pinochet case reflects the broader preferences of states, or their
courts, rather than the evaluation of a handful of judges at the ICJ.
That is, even if the absence of international adjudication does not
affect whether CIL changes, the outcome is still more legitimate from
a procedural perspective. Second, the absence of early adjudication
means that the door is more open than in the other two cases to
future legal change; domestic courts can follow Pinochet without
having to overcome any of the rationalist or normative barriers that
they faced in the other cases, which stem from the prospect of defying
an international court ruling.
In Pinochet, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon issued an arrest
warrant in October 1998 against Augusto Pinochet, the former
115
Chilean president, for the commission of torture and other crimes.
British officials arrested Pinochet in London six days later, while he
116
was visiting the city for back surgery. Pinochet’s lawyers filed suit in
British courts, arguing that the arrest warrant violated Pinochet’s
immunity as a former head of state. Although the Divisional Court in
117
London invalidated the arrest warrant, the House of Lords, in a 3118
to-2 decision, reinstated it on appeal. In what many scholars
consider to be a watershed ruling, the House of Lords held that
119
immunity attaches only to official conduct, which does not include
torture. This decision was discarded, however, due to an undisclosed
connection between one of the judges and Amnesty International,
120
which had presented arguments in the case. In a rehearing with a
different set of judges, the House of Lords upheld the arrest warrant

114. For extensive analyses of the implications of the Pinochet judgment, see generally
NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 415 (2000); and Wuerth, supra note 30.
115. Byers, supra note 114, at 415–17.
116. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2133 (1999).
117. Ex parte Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (Q.B. Div’l Ct. Oct. 28, 1998) (Eng.), reprinted in 38
I.L.M. 68, 85 (1999).
118. R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Pinochet I),
[1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) at 1457–58.
119. Id. at 1457.
120. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(Pinochet I), [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.), was annulled by Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.).
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122

again. But it did so on a narrower ground, basing its decision on
123
domestic legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture.
Many scholars and legal advocates at the time deemed the final
124
decision also to be a landmark for human rights.
Despite the anticipation that the break with CIL would “usher[]
125
in a new era of accountability” for former high-level officials, few
126
courts have explicitly followed Pinochet’s lead. The absence of a
bandwagon effect abrogating foreign sovereign immunity in the wake
of Pinochet is important. It suggests either that the opportunities for
rejecting immunity have been limited or that they have been
sufficient but courts have nonetheless adhered to the immunity rule.
Both of these possibilities are consistent with the traditional
evolutionary process of CIL. Had the ICJ issued a judgment
invalidating the Pinochet decision, it would be difficult to determine
whether the apparent but debatable persistence of the immunity rule
for former heads of state was the result of the decentralized
preferences of states or of the ICJ’s intervention.

121. Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) at 148–49.
122. Id. at 164.
123. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
124. See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet
Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 129 (2000) (“As the Pinochet precedent evolves, other countries will begin to participate in
this emerging universal system of transnational law litigation. This move away from the statecentric paradigm will have a profound effect on human rights and international law.” (footnote
omitted)).
125. See Wuerth, supra note 30, (manuscript at 1). Many argue that ultimately Pinochet did
usher in a new era. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238 (“[A] growing
number of international and national courts have abrogated the conduct immunity of former
heads of state . . . . This trend can be traced to the Pinochet case, a watershed 1999 decision in
which the British House of Lords held that Chile’s former head of state could be extradited to
Spain to stand trial for torture.” (citation omitted)).
126. In a forthcoming article, Professor Ingrid Wuerth examines subsequent immunity cases
and argues that functional immunity persists for violations of jus cogens norms. Wuerth, supra
note 30. She provides a careful analysis of relevant case law to demonstrate that immunity was
not invoked in many of the cases that are typically cited as evidence that immunity no longer
exists. Id. (manuscript at 26–35). These cases should therefore not necessarily be considered as
evidence that the traditional custom of sovereign immunity has eroded. Id. (manuscript at 26).
Professor Wuerth further points to cases that directly contradict Pinochet, including cases filed
against former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (in France), against former Chinese
President Jiang (in Germany), and against former U.S. President George W. Bush (in
Switzerland). Id. (manuscript at 22).
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Even though it does not guarantee it, the absence of preemptive
adjudication in the Pinochet case also leaves open the possibility for
future legal change. In July 2012, well over a decade after the
Pinochet decision, Switzerland’s Federal Criminal Court followed it,
refusing to grant immunity to Khaled Nezzar, a former Algerian
127
minister of defense. A human-rights NGO accused the Minister of
committing war crimes during the Algerian War from 1992 to 2000,
and two refugees from Algeria accused him of subjecting them to
128
torture in 1993. Among a number of defenses, the minister’s lawyer
argued that Nezzar enjoyed immunity for the period between 1992
129
and 1994 when he was minister of defense.
Even though
Switzerland’s Office of Foreign Affairs made clear its view that
Nezzar was shielded by immunity, the court rejected the immunity
130
claim. In reaching its decision, the court cited international criminal
treaties, as well as international reports from the United Nations, the
131
Rome Statute, and one domestic judicial ruling—the Pinochet case.
It stated that since Pinochet, immunities for former heads of state are
no longer automatically guaranteed against individual responsibility
in criminal matters, even for acts committed during their official
132
activities. It is possible that more courts will follow suit, explicitly
rejecting immunity and citing the custom-breaking Pinochet case as
precedent. CIL tends to evolve slowly, and this may be particularly
133
true for rules in which domestic courts are the main decisionmakers.
127. See Gabriella Citroni, Swiss Court Finds No Immunity for the Former Algerian Minister
of Defence Accused of War Crimes: Another Brick in the Wall of the Fight Against Impunity,
EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/swiss-court-finds-no-immunity-for-theformer-algerian-minister-of-defence-accused-of-war-crimes-another-brick-in-the-wall-of-thefight-against-impunity (“[T]he Federal Criminal Court undertook a different approach,
following the path set forth by the House of Lords in the Pinochet case and . . . thus adding
another brick in the wall of the fight against impunity.”).
128. Id.
129. Tribunal pénal fédéral [TPF] [Federal Criminal Court] July 25, 2012, BB.2011.140,
para. 5.4.2 (Switz.), available at http://bstger.weblaw.ch/pdf/20120725_BB_2011_140.pdf.
130. Id. para. E.
131. Id. para. 5.35. The court’s approach highlights the multiple sources of state practice,
and suggests numerous pathways by which CIL can develop. Cf. Wuerth, supra note 10
(suggesting that both judicial and executive actions should be considered in determining CIL).
132. Tribunal pénal federal, BB.2011.140, para. 5.35.
133. The withdrawal of immunity for commercial conduct occurred gradually over the
twentieth century. When the Italian Supreme Court issued the first high court decision rejecting
a claim to this form of immunity in 1886, there was no world court to invalidate the decision.
ELEANOR WYLLYS ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS:
CHIEFLY IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 229 (photo. reprint 2001) (1933). The next high court to
reject an immunity claim was in Belgium, and it did so only in 1903, although its lower courts
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Nonetheless, CIL can and does evolve in the absence of early
international adjudication. It is possible that CIL would eventually
evolve in the face of a contrary decision by an international court as
well, but the likelihood is lower.
The substantive point should not overshadow this broader, more
fundamental point about procedure: regardless of whether immunity
for former heads of state is withdrawn in the future, states, and not an
international court, will—through their decentralized and iterated
conduct—be the deciders.
III. INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
Despite the central tension between international adjudication
and the traditional process by which CIL evolves, courts may still be
134
able to mitigate the tension’s effects. They can do so by adopting a
minimalist decisionmaking approach in cases of preemptive
adjudication. This Part proposes one way in which the ICJ might have
been more restrained in its Germany v. Italy decision, outlining an
alternative route that would have carried less risk of impeding the
135
evolutionary CIL process. It then considers and responds to an
important criticism of the minimalist approach in the international
context—that it enables powerful states to shape customary
international rules and to enforce them unevenly, predominantly
against weaker states.

had erratically restricted immunity during the nineteenth century. Id. at 200–03, 206. It is
debatable whether the Italian and Belgian decisions would constitute custom-breaking cases
because some scholars suggest that judicial treatment of sovereign immunity claims, even at this
early point, was varied. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 25, at 111 & nn.18–28 (stating that “history
suggests that there was no general rule regulating State immunity from jurisdiction prior to
restrictive immunity becoming a rule of customary international law” and identifying dates
when various countries began to restrict foreign immunity). The gap of more than ten years
between the first and second high-court decisions nonetheless illustrates the gradual pace at
which CIL tends to evolve.
134. This proposal is particularly relevant given that a dispute regarding the sovereign
immunity of foreign state officials for jus cogens violations is pending at the ECHR. See Jones v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 34356/06 (Sept. 18, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-111560.
135. For an example of such an alternative route, see Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism:
A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123 (2005), which notes that “procedural minimalism as a general
category should be distinguished from the subcategory of democracy-forcing minimalism, which
involves an effort to issue narrow rulings that do not mandate ultimate outcomes but that force
decisions by politically accountable actors,” id. at 124.
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A. Judicial Minimalism in the International Context
Judicial minimalism is an approach to decisionmaking and
opinion writing in which courts issue constrained, incremental rulings
136
even when they have the option to be broad and sweeping.
Professor Cass Sunstein proposes that the hallmarks of minimalism
137
are narrowness and shallowness. Narrowness means that, rather
than advance broad rules or principles that are intended to or could
be used to guide decisionmaking in future cases, judges carefully
138
tailor their decisions to the cases before them. Shallowness means
that judges refrain from grounding their decisions in general theories
that can become divisive because of their potentially broader
139
impact.
In the context of international adjudication and CIL, judicial
minimalism exhibits these same qualities of narrowness and
shallowness, but has different implications. For international courts
adjudicating custom-breaking cases, judicial minimalism entails
deference not to existing law or previous courts, but to the CIL
process—the decentralized dynamic by which international custom
emerges and changes. Judicial minimalism counsels that in cases
involving custom breaking, judges should, to the extent possible, give
the CIL process a chance to unfold without the interference of
international courts. In Germany v. Italy, judicial minimalism would
have led to the same ultimate holding (that Italy violated Germany’s
state immunity) but on a narrower ground. If it had used a minimalist
approach, the ICJ might have tailored its decision more closely to the
facts of the case (narrowness) or avoided making broad theoretical
claims (shallowness). Focusing on shallowness, a minimalist approach
might have rejected Italy’s arguments but without taking a position
on the broader issue of whether procedural rules regulating immunity

136. See id. at 125 (“[I]n the most difficult and controversial domains, the Court tends to
choose relatively narrow and unambitious grounds. The Court has not accepted a large-scale
theory of constitutional interpretation; it proceeds by building cautiously on precedent, in the
fashion of common law courts.” (footnote omitted)). For a discussion of institutional
minimalism and judicial minimalism, see generally Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court,
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005).
137. Sunstein, supra note 135, at 123.
138. See id. at 129 (“[Minimalist judges] do not wish to resolve other, related problems that
might have relevant differences. They are willing to live with the costs and burdens of
uncertainty, which they tend to prefer to the risks of premature resolution of difficult issues.”).
139. See id. (stating that minimalist judges “favor arguments that do not take a stand on the
foundational debates in law and politics”).

KATZENSTEIN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2012 4:12 PM

702

[Vol. 62:671

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

conflict with substantive rules protecting jus cogens norms or the
substantive right to reparations. This avoidance technique would have
been particularly justifiable given that Italy, in its countermemorial to
the court, went out of its way to retract the arguments advanced by its
own courts that jus cogens norms prevail over rules regulating
immunity. The countermemorial states:
Italy does not pretend in general terms that when confronted
with a claim arising out of the violation of a jus cogens norm
municipal courts have jurisdiction. Italy fully agrees with Germany
that such a general exception to immunity does not yet find
confirmation in international practice, nor can it be theoretically
140
inferred from the jus cogens character of the rule violated.

Instead, Italy framed its claims in additive terms: violations of jus
cogens when combined with denial of reparations allows for the
rejection of state immunity. Even if the ICJ, in adopting this
minimalist approach, were to remain mute about the general issue of
whether procedural rules conflict with substantive norms, one could
logically extrapolate the ICJ’s position. By rejecting the additive
version (violation of jus cogens norms plus denial of reparations
equals withdrawal of immunity), the ICJ rejected the disaggregated,
constituent parts (violation of jus cogens norms leads to withdrawal of
immunity and denial of responsibility leads to withdrawal of
immunity). In remaining silent, however, the ICJ would have left
open some grey area. It would have, for example, preserved the
option to adopt a balancing test in the future, and fostered the
ambiguity necessary for CIL to develop.
The ICJ has used this type of minimalist approach before. In his
review of ICJ jurisprudence involving CIL, Professor Alberto
Alvarez-Jiménez notes that the ICJ sometimes chooses to avoid
evaluating state practice for a given CIL. He explains,
There may be, in [the] abstract, multiple reasons for this silence,
which can be either related to the early stage of development of the
State practice in question, with the convenience of waiting for a
future case with a more suitable factual situation, or to the judicial
strategy of avoidance to leave to States the resolution of complex
141
issues.

140. Counter-Memorial of Italy, supra note 103, para. 4.67.
141. Alvarez-Jiménez, supra note 7, at 704.
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Alvarez-Jiménez points to the ICJ’s approach in the Congo v.
142
Belgium case as one example. In that case, both parties agreed
during the proceedings that the ICJ should determine only whether
Belgium had violated the CIL of immunity rather than analyze the
143
issue of universal jurisdiction as well. Procedurally, this means that
the ICJ did not have the option of deciding the universal jurisdiction
issue. Nonetheless it could, as some of the judges pointed out, have
144
discussed the question as part of its reasoning. Some judges indeed
urged their colleagues on the court to do so, but ultimately the judges
refrained. Judge Oda lauded this judicial restraint because, in his
145
words, the “law [was] not sufficiently developed.”
My argument endorsing judicial minimalism in cases of custom
breaking by domestic courts is not a disguised critique that seeks the
ultimate erosion of state immunity for violations of jus cogens norms.
There are compelling reasons to support the absolute state immunity
rule. Rather, this Essay’s claim concerns the process by which CIL,
including foundational rules such as sovereign immunity, is changed
or sustained. The legitimacy of international law arguably rests on a
diversity of avenues by which it is created and recreated, avenues that
include not simply treaty negotiations and judgments by international
courts but also the decentralized decisions of individual states.
B. Elephants in the Room: The Power Critique
The proposal that international courts adopt judicial minimalism
in the context of custom breaking is likely to face some of the same
critiques that apply to the endorsement of judicial minimalism in the
United States, including that minimalism is incoherent or simply a
146
“grab-bag” approach. As Professor Tara Smith notes, “[w]hat is

142. Id. at 705.
143. See Congo v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, para. 43 (Feb. 14) (“[T]he Court
is . . . not entitled to decide upon questions not asked of it . . . . Thus in the present case the
Court may not rule, in the operative part of its Judgment, on the question whether the disputed
arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian investigating judge in exercise of his purported universal
jurisdiction, complied in that regard with the rules and principles of international law governing
the jurisdiction of national courts.”).
144. See id. (“While the Court is thus not entitled to decide upon questions not asked of it,
the non ultra petita rule nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal
points in its reasoning.”).
145. Alvarez-Jiménez, supra note 7, at 705 (quoting Congo v. Belgium, Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. 3, para. 12 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda)).
146. See Tara Smith, Reckless Caution: The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 347, 352 (2010) (“Minimalism, in practice, serves as a placeholder for a grab-bag of
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appropriately minimal in any sphere is dependent on judgments
147
concerning the value of what is being minimized.” This Essay’s
proposal will also likely face some critiques that are unique to the
international system. The most compelling of these critiques holds
that restraint by the ICJ and deference to CIL processes risk creating
148
a carte blanche for power politics. Whereas the ICJ safeguards
149
sovereign equality, CIL, some argue, heavily favors powerful states.
If rules regulating state immunity are left to states to shape, then one
outcome is a certain bet: the Belgiums of the world will reject the
immunity of smaller, weaker states, but not of the United Kingdom or
the United States. According to this critique, any shift in the CIL of
state immunity will reflect the interests and ideals of powerful states
150
only.
There are at least three possible responses to this critique. First,
the concern about powerful states unilaterally restricting the
immunity of weaker states is overstated because states’ interests may
align in less predictable ways. For instance, when Belgium began to
pursue investigations against U.S. and Israeli officials in the 1990s,
151
both countries threatened sanctions in retaliation. Belgium quickly
narrowed the universal jurisdiction provision in its criminal code, with
the effect of limiting jurisdiction not only over U.S. officials but over
152
officials from all states, including weak ones. Power does matter,
but states like Belgium would not necessarily be able to dictate the
evolution of CIL in the absence of an international court ruling.
Debates about the development of CIL, that is, may not necessarily
take the form of the powerful against the weak.
desiderata rather than as a genuine method of decision-making that carves out a definite and
distinctive type of guidance.”).
147. Id. at 364.
148. See Kelly, supra note 5, at 542 (explaining how the CIL process does not ensure
compliance and “provides only ‘paper,’ and not viable, norms, which vary from culture to
culture”).
149. See id. at 541–42 (arguing that “CIL theory is used by powerful nations to conjure up
exceptions to fundamental norms such as the prohibition on the use of force in the Charter of
the United Nations,” and that “[t]he CIL process cannot generate norms perceived as legitimate
when there is conflict about these norms or their formulation”).
150. The trend in universal jurisdiction cases attests to this likelihood. See Máximo Langer,
The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational
Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2011) (finding that, generally,
defendants from weaker states do not protest prosecutions that are based on universal
jurisdiction).
151. Id. at 30–31.
152. Id. at 31–32.
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Second, the power critique relies on the assumption that states
have unitary interests, which may be too simplistic. Governments of
weak states may be disadvantaged by a minimalist approach, while
their domestic populations may benefit. It is unclear what constitutes
“the state” or what qualifies as “state interest,” and it is therefore
difficult to evaluate whether CIL is biased against weak states.
Finally, even if the critics are correct that minimalist approaches
favor the powerful over the weak, early adjudication is not a better
alternative. If the power argument holds, then early adjudication
simply restores the traditional CIL rules that were dictated by
powerful states in the first place. It does not enable the participation
of weak states.
CONCLUSION
Scholars typically assume that two key functions of international
courts, clarifying legal rules and facilitating the development of
153
international law, are compatible. Yet, for a certain class of cases
involving custom breaking, international courts risk impeding the
traditional process by which CIL evolves. International courts risk
creating this effect because of the peculiarity of CIL. As is well
known, CIL cannot evolve without a state willing to break from the
existing customary rules. Less appreciated is the fact that it is the
responses of other states to the deviation, and not the deviation itself,
which determine the legality of such breaks, deciding whether they
mark the beginning of new legal rules. In order for CIL to change,
breaks with international custom require followers. The refusal of
states to follow custom breakers, however, is also important; it helps
reveal that states generally support the existing rules. Whether states
decide to follow a custom breaker or to adhere to traditional rules,
CIL is premised on the notion that it is the states themselves that will,
at least initially, be the ones to decide. International adjudication of
custom-breaking cases is in tension with this core premise: it
interrupts the decentralized decision-making process. To mitigate this
tension, international courts should recognize the importance of state
responses to breaks with custom. Where responses are minimal or
entirely absent because the break from custom has recently occurred,
international courts should, where possible, grant states more time.

153. See supra Introduction.

